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Abstract
We show that systemic risk in the banking sector breeds macroeconomic uncer-
tainty. In a production economy with a banking sector, financial constraints of banks
can lead to disastrous banking panics. We find that a higher probability of a banking
panic increases uncertainty in the aggregate economy. We explore the implications of
this banking panic-driven uncertainty for business cycles, asset prices and macropru-
dential regulation. Banking panic-driven uncertainty amplifies business cycle volatility,
increases risk premia on asset prices and yields a new benefit from countercyclical bank
capital buffers.
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1 Introduction
In this paper, we study how systemic risk in the banking sector affects the real economy
through a novel feedback loop between systemic risk and macroeconomic uncertainty and
explore how macroprudential policy can help to dampen this negative feedback loop.
The financial crisis of 2007-2009 was associated with a significant rise in both systemic
risk in the banking sector and macroeconomic uncertainty more broadly: Fears of a systemic
banking panic resulting in a disastrous breakdown of the financial sector were widespread.
Measures of systemic risk in the banking sector increased substantially. In the top left panel
of Figure 1, we show the TED spread, which proxies default risk premia in the US banking
sector and is thus a good indicator of systemic risk. The TED spread is usually close to
zero, but increased almost tenfold from 0.38 in January 2007 to 3.35 in October 2008. This
corresponds to an increase of roughly 7 standard deviations over the mean relative to the
data from 1986-2007, which represents a substantial increase in systemic risk.
[Figure 1 about here.]
This risk spilled over into the aggregate economy: Measures of more broad financial
and macroeconomic risk spiked, too. Consider for example the real uncertainty index con-
structed by Jurado, Ludvigson, and Ng (2015). We show it as the blue line in the top right
panel of Figure 1. This index measures the conditional volatility in an exhaustive set of
macroeconomic time series. The red line is a broader macro-financial uncertainty index,
which additionally measures uncertainty in financial markets. During the financial crisis,
it increased by about a third. This is an increase of 8 standard deviations over the mean
relative to the data from 1986-2007. As we show in the bottom two panels of Figure 1, credit
risk premia increased substantially, and investment and output plummeted. This negatively
affected bank balance sheets and increased the likelihood of a systemic banking panic.
As a consequence of this disastrous event, the US and many other countries introduced
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a countercylical capital buffer (CCyB) for banks as a new policy instrument.1 The stated
purpose of such a policy is not to only to structurally rebalance the capital structure of banks,
but also to reduce systemic risk in the economy by curbing excessive credit booms which
can lead to severe downturns when they end.2 However, the exact macroeconomic effects of
this policy, in particular in a regime with elevated systemic risk, remain the subject of an
ongoing debate.
These observations lead us to our research questions: How does an increase in systemic
risk in the banking sector relate to an increase in macroeconomic uncertainty more broadly?
What are the implications of endogenous systemic risk for business cycle dynamics and
asset prices? And how does the spillover of systemic risk into the real economy affect the
desirability of macroprudential policy?
To tackle these questions, we develop a simple model of a production economy with
a financial sector, based on Gertler, Kiyotaki, and Prestipino (2019): Households lend to
banks, which in turn lend to firms. Firms use these loans to make investments. Banks are
subject to a moral hazard problem in the spirit of Gertler and Karadi (2011). This is a way
to introduce a financial constraint for the banking sector. As a consequence of the moral
hazard problem, banks face an incentive constraint that limits their borrowing to a time-
varying multiple of their equity. We interpret this incentive constraint as a market-imposed
capital requirement. Crucially, the incentive constraint implies that a bank with zero or
negative net worth cannot operate and must default. Due to this constraint, banks face
systemic banking panics in the spirit of Cole and Kehoe (2000) and Gertler and Kiyotaki
(2015). A banking panic of that kind occurs, when expectations about a banking panic drive
1See e.g. https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/bcreg20160908b.htm for
the US.
2See e.g. Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2010), page 7, paragraph 29: As witnessed during
the financial crisis, losses incurred in the banking sector during a downturn preceded by a period of excess
credit growth can be extremely large. Such losses can destabilise the banking sector, which can bring about
or exacerbate a downturn in the real economy. This in turn can further destabilise the banking sector.
These interlinkages highlight the particular importance of the banking sector building up its capital defences
in periods when credit has grown to excessive levels. The building up of these defences should have the
additional benefit of helping to moderate excess credit growth.
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down the prices of banks’ assets so much that the net worth of banks becomes negative.
Banking panics are disastrous events, resulting in a large increase in risk premia as well
as a contraction of output, consumption and investment. They arise with an endogenous,
time-varying probability. We define the probability of such a banking panic as systemic risk,
using the terms banking panic risk and systemic risk interchangeably.
Our first main result is that an increase in systemic risk leads to an increase in macroeco-
nomic uncertainty, i.e. in the conditional volatility of output. The model therefore provides
a tight link between systemic risk in the financial sector and more broadly defined macroeco-
nomic uncertainty. To our knowledge, making this link explicit and studying its implications
in a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model is a novel contribution to the literature.
Systemic risk increases the conditional volatility of the economy, because the probability of a
banking panic is endogenous and highly state-dependent. Since the probability of a banking
panic in a state with a good realization of the exogenous shock is unchanged, output in those
states is unaffected. In states of the world with a bad realization of the exogenous shock, the
possibility of a banking panic increases the range of bad outcomes. Therefore, the presence
of banking panic risk widens the conditional distribution of output by creating downside
risk. Our results are consistent with the results reported in Adrian, Boyarchenko, and Gi-
annone (2019), who report that during times of financial stress, the conditional distribution
of GDP in the US has higher downside risk. Moreover, the evidence in Giglio, Kelly, and
Pruitt (2016) also provides strong support for the channel we emphasize by showing that an
increase in systemic risk predicts a higher likelihood of a low realization of output.
For our second main result, we investigate the importance of this banking panic-driven
uncertainty for macroeconomic dynamics. We find that banking panic-driven uncertainty is
a novel channel that increases the unconditional volatility of macroeconomic aggregates and
asset prices. We arrive at this result by comparing an economy with endogenous banking
panic risk to an economy without banking panics. Crucially, in the model without bank-
ing panics, banks otherwise face the same financial constraints as in our baseline model
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with banking panics. The transmission mechanism through which banking panic-driven un-
certainty amplifies shocks works through a precautionary savings channel and a financial
constraints channel. A negative macroeconomic shock increases the likelihood of a banking
panic. Macroeconomic uncertainty about future consumption increases. As a consequence,
the returns on risk-free assets fall as savers seek to insure themselves against future un-
certainty. The returns on risky assets increase, as risk-averse investors demand higher risk
premia. Higher risk premia in turn lead to a higher required return on investment for the
non-financial sector and hence lower investment and output. This is the precautionary sav-
ings channel. The moral hazard problem ties the borrowing capacity of banks to the market
value of their net worth. As bank net worth is a risky asset, the return on banks’ net worth
increases which implies that the market price of banks’ net worth falls. Banks are forced
to contract lending, which increases the required return on investment for the non-financial
sector. Output and investment fall. This is the financial constraints channel.
As our third main result, we investigate the importance of this novel banking panic
uncertainty channel for the benefits from macroprudential policy. We focus on a dynamic
capital requirement policy that the regulator sets to dampen credit booms, which lead to an
excess build-up of systemic risk. In particular, we investigate the contributions of banking
panics and systemic risk to the welfare gain of a policy that seeks to offset the feedback
loop between asset prices, bank balance sheets and investment, i.e. the so called financial
accelerator effect (Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999)). It is desirable, because the
regulator can in that way correct for the fact that banks fail to internalize that their lending
decisions, through asset prices, affect the likelihood of a banking panic. There is therefore a
pecuniary externality in the model. Banking panics are inefficient, because they arise as a
coordination of the agents on a dominated equilibrium. The panic equilibrium is dominated,
because relative to the good equilibrium, lending to the non-financial sector is not undertaken
by the most efficient lenders, i.e. the banks. When we again compare the two models with
and without banking panic uncertainty, we find that there is a new benefit from this policy in
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the model with banking panic-driven uncertainty, since dampening the financial accelerator
also reduces the likelihood of a banking panic, which lowers uncertainty. Put bluntly, we
show that macroprudential policy is more beneficial in a regime with elevated systemic risk
in the banking sector.
Literature Our model builds on recent work by Gertler, Kiyotaki, and Prestipino (2019).
There are two key differences between our model and theirs: First, banking crises in our
model are persistent, and second, households have recursive Epstein and Zin (1989) (EZ)-
preferences, which allows us to calibrate the model using asset pricing data.3 Relative to
Gertler, Kiyotaki, and Prestipino (2019), we focus on the effects of banking panic risk on
macroeconomic uncertainty and highlight the importance of this uncertainty channel.
More generally, our paper is at the intersection of the literature on financial crises in
macroeconomic models and the literature on the effects of uncertainty on business cycles.
We contribute to this literature by highlighting the effect of uncertainty that results from
the possibility of banking panics as a new channel through which financial crises can affect
macroeconomic dynamics. We argue that the macroeconomic uncertainty caused by the
spike in systemic risk is an important feedback channel that amplifies the severity of financial
crises. There are now many macroeconomics models of financial crises: Our paper belongs to
a strand of the literature that models financial crises as rollover crises in the spirit of Calvo
(1988) and Cole and Kehoe (2000), e.g. Gertler and Kiyotaki (2015), Gertler, Kiyotaki,
and Prestipino (2016), Paul (2018), and Gertler, Kiyotaki, and Prestipino (2019). Other
papers model financial crises as a financial constraint of a leveraged agent becoming binding,
e.g. Mendoza (2010), Bianchi (2011), He and Krishnamurthy (2012) or Brunnermeier and
Sannikov (2014).
Due to this focus on macroeconomic uncertainty, our paper also naturally connects to the
macroeconomic literature on the effects of macroeconomic uncertainty shocks on macroeco-
3The use of EZ-preferences to match asset prices is common in the macro-finance literature, see e.g. Van
Binsbergen, Ferna´ndez-Villaverde, Koijen, and Rubio-Ramı´rez (2012) or Rudebusch and Swanson (2012).
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nomic dynamics. Relative to this literature, we first present banking panic risk as a novel
channel through which macroeconomic uncertainty can arise endogenously. We second study
how uncertainty feeds back into amplifying systemic risk. Third, we show that an increase in
uncertainty due to banking panic risk is not symmetric, but concentrated in the left tail of the
output distribution. In general, this literature focuses on exogenous, symmetric uncertainty
shocks, e.g. Born and Pfeifer (2014), Ferna´ndez-Villaverde, Guerro´n-Quintana, Kuester, and
Rubio-Ramı´rez (2015), Leduc and Liu (2016) and Basu and Bundick (2017). Others, e.g.
Fajgelbaum, Schaal, and Taschereau-Dumouchel (2017) or Cacciatore and Ravenna (2018)
present mechanisms in which uncertainty arises endogenously or in which exogenous uncer-
tainty shocks get endogenously amplified. The idea that small probabilities of large disasters
can have big consequences for asset prices and macroeconomic dynamics has been explored,
in a model with exogenous disasters, in Barro (2009) and Gourio (2012). Banking panics
in our model can be interpreted as a particular kind of disasters that arise with an endoge-
nous probability. Adrian, Boyarchenko, and Giannone (2019) and Alessandri and Mumtaz
(2019) present empirical evidence that financial stress and macroeconomic uncertainty are
connected.
The paper is lastly related to the literature on the macroeconomic effects of bank regula-
tion, in particular dynamic capital requirements. We study endogenous banking panic-driven
uncertainty as a novel channel which increases welfare gains from dynamic capital require-
ments. The macroeconomic effects of simple, static capital requirements have been studied
for example in Angeloni and Faia (2013), Begenau and Landvoigt (2018) or Begenau (2019).
Gertler, Kiyotaki, and Queralto (2012) discusses dynamic capital requirements in a model
with exogenous disasters. Faria-e Castro (2019) investigates the macroeconomic effects of
countercyclical capital buffers on banking panics, but not focus on the uncertainty channel.
Akinci and Queralto (2017) consider the effects of macroprudential regulation in an econ-
omy in which banking crises arise when financial constraints in the banking sector become
binding. Gersbach and Rochet (2017) study countercyclical capital buffers in an economy in
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which pecuniary externalities lead banks to excessively lend, which causes misallocation.
Outline We proceed as follows: In section 2, we introduce the model. We characterize the
equilibrium and formalize banking panic risk in section 3. We explain how banking panic risk
affects macroeconomic uncertainty, and how macroeconomic uncertainty in turn feeds back
into the economy in section 4. We calibrate the model in section 5. In section 6, we show
what a typical banking panic in the model looks like. We explore the connection between
systemic risk and macroeconomic uncertainty in the model, as well their implications for
macroeconomic dynamics in section 7. In section 8, we discuss macroprudential regulation.
Finally, section 9 concludes.
2 Model
The model is a simple, stylized production economy with a financial sector, based on Gertler,
Kiyotaki, and Prestipino (2019). The key feature of the model is that financial frictions in
the banking sector can lead to self-fulfilling rollover crises on banks in the spirit of Calvo
(1988), Cole and Kehoe (2000) and Gertler and Kiyotaki (2015).
There are many households which each consist of a measure f of workers and a measure
1 − f of bankers. Within each household, there is perfect consumption risk sharing. The
households own and operate firms which produce consumption goods, firms which produce
investment goods, and mutual funds. Workers supply a unit of labor in fixed supply, make
loans to consumption goods producers and deposits to banks. Bankers own and operate
banks. They use debt and their net worth to make loans to consumption goods producers.
Banks accumulate retained earnings until they exit the economy with exogenous probability.
In that case, they transfer the retained earnings as dividend income to their household. A
moral hazard problem limits the ability of banks to issue debt to a time-varying multiple of
their net worth, i.e. their leverage. Consumption goods producers own the capital stock, and
use capital and labor to produce consumption goods. Investment goods producers transform
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consumption goods into investment goods using a technology which has decreasing returns
to scale in the short run due to investment adjustment costs. Finally, mutual funds manage
the portfolio of loans to consumption goods producers made directly by households against
a fee. We begin by describing the non-standard part of the model, which are the household
and the banking sector. We follow the convention that lower case letters for variables denote
individual variables, while upper case letters denote aggregate variables.
2.1 Households
Preferences Households maximize utility from consumption. Their utility function V Ht is
given by Epstein and Zin (1989)-preferences, which are defined recursively as:
V Ht =
(
(1− β) (cHt )1−σ + βEt [(V Ht+1)1−γ] 1−σ1−γ) 11−σ , (2.1)
where Et denotes the expectation conditional on time t information and β is the discount
factor of the household. cHt denotes household consumption in period t. γ is the coefficient
of relative risk aversion, σ the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution of the
household. These preferences imply that the stochastic discount factor of the household is
given by
Λt,t+1 = β
(
cHt+1
cHt
)−σ V Ht+1
Et
[(
V Ht+1
)1−γ] 11−γ

σ−γ
. (2.2)
With σ = γ, this preference specification collapses to constant relative risk aversion prefer-
ences. γ > σ implies that households have a preference for early resolution of uncertainty.
Budget constraint Workers consume, make state-contingent long-term loans to consump-
tion goods producers aHt+1 through mutual funds and hold non-state-contingent one period
debt dHt+1 issued by banks. They also have access to a risk-free one period bond bt+1, which is
in zero net supply. We introduce this bond to ensure that the concept of a risk-free interest
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rate is well-defined. Since loans to consumption goods producers are effectively claims to
the capital stock of those firms, they are valued at the market price of capital Qt. The
investments of workers into firms are managed by mutual funds, which charge a capital
management fee ft. Workers supply one unit of labor inelastically and receive a wage Wt as
labor income.4 They receive profits Πt of firms and banks. Loans to banks yield a return
R˜Dt+1 in the subsequent period. Loans to firms pay a return R
A
t+1. The budget constraint of
the household is given by
cHt + (Qt + ft)a
H
t+1 + b
H
t+1 + d
H
t+1 = R
A
t a
H
t + R˜
D
t d
H
t +R
B
t b
H
t +Wt + Πt. (2.3)
2.2 Banks
Objective function Banks are operated by bankers. They maximize
V Bt = EtΛt,t+1(1− pt+1)
[
ηnBt+1 + (1− η)V Bt+1
]
, (2.4)
where Λt,t+1 is the stochastic discount factor of households from period t to t + 1, η is a
probability that the bank exits the economy, pt is the probability that the bank defaults in
period t and nBt is the net worth of the bank at the beginning of period t.
Entry and exit As in Gertler and Karadi (2011), we assume that with probability η, a
banker will be forced to give up his bank, sell its assets, repay its liabilities and pay the net
worth to households. We introduce this assumption to ensure that banks will not outsave
their borrowing constraints. To keep the mass of bankers constant, an equal mass of workers
will start operating a bank with start-up funding nB,newt . This start-up funding is given by
a fraction υ of the total assets traded in the economy: nB,newt = υAt.
4To keep the model as simple as possible, we model labor supply as constant. Endogenizing the labor
supply choice is straightforward and would not substantially affect the results.
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Net worth Banks issue debt dBt+1. They make loans to consumption good producers a
B
t+1,
who use these loans to purchase capital. Since there are no financial frictions between the
firms and banks, these loans can be understood as direct claims on the capital stock of firms.5
In period t, incumbent banks obtain a gross return on loans, RAt a
B
t . They pay a return R
D
t d
B
t
to households on their debt. An incumbent bank’s net worth at the beginning of period t is
given by
nBt = R
A
t a
B
t −RDt dBt . (2.5)
Banks will optimally accumulate net worth until they exit the economy. Since we focus on
the macroeconomic dynamics in the short run, we assume that banks cannot issue additional
equity. It is a common assumption in the literature that equity issuance carries at least some
cost for banks, see e.g. Akinci and Queralto (2017), Begenau (2019) or Corbae and D’Erasmo
(2018). Hence, the equity of banks corresponds to their net worth.
Balance sheet The balance sheet constraint of banks states that assets Qta
B
t+1 equal
liabilities dBt+1 plus equity n
B
t :
Qta
B
t+1 = d
B
t+1 + n
B
t . (2.6)
We define the leverage of a bank φBt as the value of its assets divided by the value of its
equity:
φBt ≡
Qta
B
t+1
nBt
. (2.7)
Moral hazard problem To motivate the existence of a market-imposed capital require-
ment, we introduce the following moral hazard problem: banks can divert a fraction of their
assets after they have made their borrowing and lending decisions. In particular, a fraction
ψ, 0 < ψ < 1 of their loans to firms can be diverted by the banker for personal consumption.
5This is obviously a modelling shortcut to make bank balance sheets responsive to current market prices.
Another way to introduce state-contingency into bank balance sheets is through defaultable long-term debt,
e.g. as in Ferrante (2018).
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If bankers divert assets, they will not repay their liabilities. Their creditors, i.e. the workers
of other households, will force the banks to exit the economy if they observe diversion. The
owner of the bank will return to being a worker. Because diversion occurs at the end of
the period before next period uncertainty realizes, an incentive constraint on the banks can
ensure that diversion will never occur in equilibrium. This incentive constraint states that
the benefit of diversion must be smaller or equal to the continuation value of the bank:
ψQta
B
t+1 ≤ V Bt (2.8)
Default The franchise value of operating a bank which does not receive an exit shock in
period t, V Bt , can be shown to be linear in the net worth of the bank:
Proposition 2.1. The value function of the bank is linear in its net worth: V Bt = Ω
B
t n
B
t ,
where ΩBt > 0 only depends on the aggregate state of the economy, but not on bank-specific
variables.
With this, we can show that the incentive constraint 2.8 of the bank implies a borrowing
limit is linear in its net worth:
dBt+1 ≤
Φt
1− Φtn
B
t , (2.9)
Φt =
EtΛt,t+1(η + (1− η)Ωt+1)R
A
t+1
Qt
− ψ
EtΛt,t+1(η + (1− η)Ωt+1)RDt+1
.
This implies that creditors are not willing to lend to the bank, when the net worth of the
bank is negative. Moreover, a negative net worth means by definition that the bank cannot
repay its liabilities and is insolvent. Therefore, when
RAt a
B
t ≤ RDt dBt , (2.10)
the bank will default. The creditors of the bank, which are the workers of other households
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than the household the bank belongs to, will liquidate the assets of the bank.6 The recovery
rate on their debt is given by
xDt =
RAt a
B
t
RDt d
B
t
. (2.11)
The return on deposits that households receive is hence
R˜Dt =
 R
D
t if the bank is solvent
xDt R
D
t if the bank is insolvent
. (2.12)
Regulation The regulator follows a dynamic policy, which corresponds to a countercyclical
capital buffer. We model this policy as an upper bound on leverage:
φBt ≤ φ¯Bt , (2.13)
ln φ¯Bt = ln φ¯
B − τ(lnNBt − lnNB). (2.14)
For τ > 0, this formulation implies that the regulator tightens the leverage constraint when-
ever net worth of the aggregate banking sector NBt is higher than its net worth in the
stochastic steady state NB, with elasticity τ . ln denotes the natural logarithm.
2.3 Consumption goods producers
Consumption goods producers choose labor lFt , capital s
F
t+1 and loans a
F
t+1 to maximize
Et
∞∑
s=t
Λt,sΠ
F
s . (2.15)
6This assumption ensures that bankers do not internalize the effect of their decisions on the recovery
value of banks’ creditors in default.
13
Profits ΠFt are given by
ΠFt = (k
F
t )
α(lFt )
1−α −WtlFt +Qt
[
aFt+1 −
RAt
Qt
aFt
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Borrowing
−Qt
[
sFt+1 − (1− δ)kFt
]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Investment
.
We make a distinction between beginning-of-period capital kFt and end-of-period capital s
F
t .
Beginning-of-period capital is given by kFt = Zts
F
t . Following Merton (1973) and Gertler
and Karadi (2011), Zt is a capital quality shock which generates exogenous variation in
the price of capital. We interpret it as fraction of the capital stock becoming obsolete and
losing its economic value. The difference to depreciation δ is that the capital quality shock
arises before production, whereas depreciation occurs after production. It follows an AR(1)
process:
ln(Zt) = (1− ρZ)µZ + ρZ ln(Zt−1) + t, (2.16)
where |ρZ | < 1 and t ∼ N(0, σZ). Since firms refinance themselves exclusively with loans,
their balance sheet constraint is sFt+1 = a
F
t+1. Their optimality condition for bank loans
implies that
RAt = Zt
(
α(kFt )
α−1(lFt )
1−α + (1− δ)Qt
)
. (2.17)
2.4 Capital goods producers
Capital goods producers transform consumption goods into capital goods with a technology
that has decreasing returns to scale in the short run due to investment adjustment costs.
They maximize profits ΠQt with respect to their output, it. Profits are given by
ΠQt = Qtit − it −
θ
2
(
it
It−1
− 1
)2
It−1. (2.18)
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Note that capital producers take aggregate investment in the last period, It−1, as given.7
Hence, the problem of the capital producer is static.
2.5 Mutual funds
Competitive mutual funds manage the portfolio of loans that households directly invest into
the consumption goods producers. Following Gertler, Kiyotaki, and Prestipino (2019), they
face a cost function of providing this service, which is quadratic in the amount of loans a˜Mt
they manage. There is a cutoff ζ below which the funds can manage capital as efficiently as
banks. They maximize profits, which are given by
ΠMt = fta˜
M
t+1 −
χ
2
max
(
a˜Mt+1
At
− ζ, 0
)2
At (2.19)
We model this cost as a function of the share of capital managed by the funds and not as a
function of the level to ensure that the mutual fund sector can scale with the economy in the
long run. The cutoff ζ represents the share of investment projects above which the banking
sector can better evaluate and monitor. If the mutual fund sector is forced to undertake a
larger share of investment, e.g. due to the banking sector being insolvent, an efficiency loss
arises.
2.6 Aggregation
Since the policy functions of an individual bank are linear in net worth, we will characterize
the equilibrium in terms of the aggregate banking sector. The aggregate net worth of the
7Usually in the business cycle literature, firms internalize the effect of their investment decisions on future
investment adjustment costs. Moreover, the investment adjustment cost is usually normalized with respect
to It instead of It−1. Since the cost function under these two assumptions is very badly behaved for levels
of investments far away from the lagged level of investment, and since we solve for the global equilibrium
dynamics of the model, we have adopted this simpler, better behaved formulation.
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banking sector is given by the sum of the net worth of incumbent and newly entering banks:
NBt = (1− η)nBt + ηnB,newt .
Aggregate output is given by production net of the capital holding costs:
Yt = K
α
t −
χ
2
max
(
a˜Mt+1
At
− ζ, 0
)2
At. (2.20)
We define as aggregate investment I˜t as the total expenditure necessary to change the capital
stock from Kt to St+1. Therefore, our measure of aggregate investment includes the invest-
ment adjustment costs: Define It as net investment excluding capital adjustment costs, that
is
It = St+1 − (1− δ)Kt.
Then, investment is given by
I˜t = It +
θ
2
(
It
It−1
− δ
)2
It−1. (2.21)
There is a representative household. Hence, the individual consumption and aggregate
consumption are equal, cHt = C
H
t . Household consumption can be inferred from the aggregate
resource constraint:
CHt = Yt − I˜t (2.22)
3 Equilibrium
In this section, we formalize the concept of systemic risk in the model. The model has an
equilibrium with solvent banks and an equilibrium with insolvent banks. We characterize
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those equilibria in Appendix D. We discuss here equilibrium multiplicity in the model as
well as equilibrium selection.
3.1 Equilibrium multiplicity and banking panics
Since the net worth of incumbent banks is among the state variables which determine the
capital price, and the capital price vice versa determines the net worth of banks, there is the
possibility for both equilibra to coexist given the same fundamental state of the economy in
the model:8 If bank creditors believe that the capital price is high, they will continue to lend
to the banks, which thus remain solvent and allows them to lend, which will justify the high
capital price. If bank creditors instead believe that the capital price is low, they will not lend
to the banks, which as a consequence become insolvent and stop lending to the economy,
justifying the low capital price. Note that in contrast to Diamond and Dybvig (1983), the
decision of the bank creditors is not about whether to withdraw outstanding debt from the
banks or not, but about whether they should keep lending to the banks or not. Strategic
complementarity arises between the decisions of the bank creditors arises, because due to
2.8, it is not optimal to lend to a bank with a negative net worth.
Define two recovery values for an individual bank: The recovery value xD denotes the
recovery value of an insolvent, individual bank if no systemic bank default arises. The
recovery value xD,∗ denotes the recovery value of an individual bank if a systemic bank
default arises. We can divide the state space of the model into three zones. In the first
zone, the safe zone, both the recovery value without a systemic bank default, xD, as well
as the recovery value of bank creditors with a systemic bank default, xD,∗, are bigger than
one. This implies that independent of the beliefs of bank creditors about the solvency of the
banking sector, the banking sector is solvent. In that case, the no-panic-equilibrium is the
unique equilibrium of the economy.
In the second zone, the multiplicity zone, recovery values are bigger than one if the
8As noted by Thaler (2018) and Christiano (2018), there is the possibility of a third, partial default
equilibrium in the model, which turns out not to be quantitatively relevant for our calibration.
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banking sector as a whole is solvent, but smaller than one if there is a systemic bank default.
In this zone, both the equilibrium with solvent banks and the equilibrium with insolvent
banks exist, because the solvency of banks depends on the beliefs of bank creditors about
the solvency of banks. We assume that agents coordinate on the equilibrium with insolvent
banks if they observe the sunspot realization ΞR. If agents coordinate on the equilibrium
with insolvent banks, we follow Gertler, Kiyotaki, and Prestipino (2019) in calling this a
banking panic.
In the third zone, the crisis zone, recovery values are less than one both if banks there
is no systemic bank default and if there is a systemic bank default. In that case, the panic-
equilibrium is the unique equilibrium of the economy, because, independently of the beliefs
of the bank creditors, the banking sector is insolvent. The expected probability that the
economy will end up in the banking panic-equilibrium in the next period is then given by
Etpt+1 = Et
1(xDt+1 ≤ 1 and xD,∗t+1 ≤ 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Default due to insolvency
+pH 1(xDt+1 > 1 and x
D,∗
t+1 ≤ 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Default due to panic
 (3.1)
Note that the state-dependency of the banking panic probability arises only as a result of
the state-dependency of the existence condition of the multiplicity zone and the crisis zone.
There is no exogenous state-dependency built into the sunspot probability.
3.2 Decomposing the banking panic condition
It will be useful to decompose the recovery value of bank creditors into four components:
xD,∗t =
RA,∗t
RAt︸ ︷︷ ︸
1−Liquidation
discount
RAt /Qt−1
RBt︸ ︷︷ ︸
Firm credit
spread
RBt
RDt︸︷︷︸
Bank credit
spread
φt−1
φt−1 − 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
Bank leverage
, (3.2)
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where RBt is the risk-free interest rate. The first term is inversely related to the liquidation
discount, which reflects how much asset returns fall in a banking panic. The second and
third term measure the spread between the return on bank assets and the return on bank
liabilities, which can be interpreted as bank profitability. The last term is inversely related
to bank leverage. The model predicts that a banking panic is more likely if the expected
liquidation discount is higher, the realized firm credit spread is lower, the bank credit spread
is higher and bank leverage is higher.
4 Banking panic risk and macroeconomic uncertainty
In this section, we illustrate how an increase in banking panic risk can increase macroeco-
nomic uncertainty. We show that both banking panic risk and macroeconomic uncertainty
are highly state-dependent. Finally, we discuss how macroeconomic uncertainty affects the
economy and feeds back into banking panic risk through a precautionary savings channel
and a financial frictions channel.
4.1 Measuring uncertainty
We measure macroeconomic uncertainty by the conditional volatility of output StDevt(Yt+1),
which is given by
StDevt(Yt+1) =
[∫
εt+1
[
pt+1
(
Y ∗t+1 −EtYt+1
)2
+ (1− pt+1) (Yt+1 −EtYt+1)2
]
dF (εt+1)
] 1
2
,
(4.1)
with the conditional expectation of future output given by
EtYt+1 =
∫
εt+1
[
pt+1Y
∗
t+1 + (1− pt+1)Yt+1
]
dF (εt+1). (4.2)
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Intuitively, this conditional volatility tells us how much uncertainty there is around the
forecast for output in the next period.
We also split uncertainty into uncertainty about the lower tail of the output distri-
bution, StDev−t (Yt+1), and uncertainty about the upper tail of the output distribution,
StDev+t (Yt+1). We compute those statistics as
StDev−t (Yt+1) =
[∫
εt+1
[
pt+1
(
Y ∗t+1 −EtYt+1
)2
1(Y ∗t+1≤Q0.5t (Yt+1))
+(1− pt+1) (Yt+1 −EtYt+1)2
]
1(Yt+1≤Q0.5t (Yt+1))dF (εt+1)
] 1
2 , (4.3)
and
StDev+t (Yt+1) =
[∫
εt+1
[
pt+1
(
Y ∗t+1 −EtYt+1
)2
1(Y ∗t+1>Q
0.5
t (Yt+1))
+(1− pt+1) (Yt+1 −EtYt+1)2
]
1(Yt+1>Q0.5t (Yt+1))
dF (εt+1)
] 1
2 , (4.4)
where 1(.) is an indicator function that takes the value one when the condition in brackets
is fulfilled and is zero otherwise and Q0.5t (Yt+1) is the conditional median of future output.
Intuitively, these statistics measure the respective volatility in the left tail and in the right
tail of the output distribution.
4.2 The effect of banking panic risk on macroeconomic uncer-
tainty
To illustrate the effects of banking panic risk on conditional output volatility, we consider
the following thought experiment: Suppose we compare two economies which are identical,
economy A and economy B. The only difference is that in economy A, sunspot shocks can
lead agents to coordinate on the panic equilibrium if multiple equilibria are possible, whereas
in economy B, agents never coordinate on the panic equilibrium if multiple equilibria are
possible. By how much is the conditional volatility of output in economy A in the region
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with equilibrium multiplicity higher than in economy B?
[Figure 2 about here.]
The top panel of Figure 2 shows the conditional distribution of output relative to the
expected output conditional on no panic in a state of the world with high future banking
panic risk. Economy A is the solid blue line and economy B the dashed red line. We compare
the economies for the same state of the economy at time t. We can see that for economy
B, the range of possible realizations of output is distributed symmetrically around expected
output. In contrast to that in economy B, a second, albeit small peak of the distribution
exists at around 7 percent below expected output in the no-run state. As a consequence of
this second peak, the conditional volatility of output is roughly twice as high in the economy
with panics compared to the economy without panics.
This increase in the conditional volatility of output will only arise in states of the world
tomorrow where the banking panic equilibrium exists, which depends on the state of the
world today. As a consequence, the conditional volatility of output is endogenously highly
state-dependent. To illustrate this, consider the bottom panel of Figure 2. This compares
the economy with panics to the economy without panics in a state in which there is no
banking panic risk. In this state, the conditional volatility of future output is essentially
identical in both economies. Banking panic risk thus only increases the left tail of the
output distribution, and only during times of heightened financial stress, in line with the
evidence in Giglio, Kelly, and Pruitt (2016) and Adrian, Boyarchenko, and Giannone (2019).
4.3 The feedback loop between banking panic risk and macroeco-
nomic uncertainty
The increase in macroeconomic uncertainty due to the higher banking panic risk affects the
macroeconomy through two channels:
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First, a precautionary savings channel leads households to reduce their demand for bank
debt and their demand for loans issued by the non-financial sector: This can be seen from
the first-order conditions of the household. Consider first the first-order condition for the
risk-free bond:
1 = EtΛt,t+1R
B
t+1. (4.5)
An increase in uncertainty increases the stochastic discount factor by making future con-
sumption more volatile. As a consequence, the risk-free return RBt+1 must fall. Consider next
the first-order condition for the direct lending of the household to the non-financial sector:
Qt + ft = EtΛt,t+1R
A
t+1. (4.6)
As the stochastic discount factor increases, the expected return on firm loans will fall. More-
over, the covariance between the return on capital and the stochastic discount factor will
become more negative, such that the household will demand a higher risk premium on firm
loans. If the effect on the risk premium dominates the effect on the risk-free return, the price
of capital will fall. This negatively impacts bank balance sheets, reduces bank lending and
investment and increases bank leverage, which increases the future probability of a banking
crisis.
Second, an increase in uncertainty operates through a financial constraints channel, which
tightens the leverage constraint of banks 2.8. This leverage constraint can be rewritten as
ψφBt = Ω
B
t
= EtΛt,t+1(1− pt+1)
[
η + (1− η)ΩBt+1
] nBt+1
nBt
(4.7)
There is a negative level effect, since the stochastic discount factor is lower. Moreover, the
covariance of the stochastic discount factor, bank net worth growth nBt+1/n
B
t and the value
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of an additional unit of net worth in the next period ΩBt+1 becomes more negative. Hence,
the continuation value of operating a bank becomes more negative, such that bank creditors
will tighten the bank leverage constraint, reducing bank lending, and hence investment and
asset prices.
5 Calibration
We now turn to a quantitative evaluation of the macroeconomic effects of the banking panic-
driven uncertainty channel. In this section, we outline the calibration strategy for the model
and evaluate the model fit. The calibration is quarterly. We report the parameters in Table
1. We describe the data in Appendix A.
[Table 1 about here.]
Technology We calibrate the parameter of the production function, α, to match a capital
income share of 36 percent. We set the depreciation rate δ to match an annual depreciation
rate of 10 percent. To calibrate the autocorrelation ρZ and the standard deviation σZ of the
capital quality process, we target the autocorrelation and standard deviation of output. We
calibrate the investment adjustment cost parameter θ to target the volatility of investment.
Preferences We choose the preference parameters β, σ and γ to match asset prices. We
set the discount factor of the household, β, to match the real risk-free interest rate in the
stochastic steady state. We assume for this that the average interest rate between the first
quarter of 1986 to the last quarter of 2006 corresponds to the stochastic steady state. We
choose the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, σ, to match the volatility
of the real risk-free interest rate and the risk aversion, γ, to match the volatility of the credit
spread.
23
Financial sector There are five parameters for the financial sector: The loan management
fee parameters χ and ζ, the share of divertable assets ψ, the exit rate of bankers η and
the initial endowment of new bankers υ. We set these parameters jointly to target the
following moments: A share of intermediation through the banking sector of 50 percent in
the stochastic steady state, in line with Gertler and Kiyotaki (2015), a leverage of of 10 in the
stochastic steady state, in line with Gertler and Kiyotaki (2015), Begenau and Landvoigt
(2018) and the evidence in Di Tella (2019), a credit spread of about 3.7 percent in the
stochastic steady state, consistent with the average spread between the Moody’s BAA yield
and the Federal Funds Rate between the first quarter of 1986 and the last quarter of 2006,
a planning horizon of banks of 2.5 years and an increase in the credit spread in a panic of
7.29 percent. This corresponds to the peak to trough change in the Moody’s BAA spread
over the federal funds rate from the first quarter of 2007 to the fourth quarter of 2008.
Sunspot We set the sunspot probability pR to match a frequency of banking crises of about
2.5 percent per year, consistent with the frequency of financial crises in developed economies
in Laeven and Valencia (2012). Finally, we set the persistence of the panic equilibrium pi to
target an average duration of a banking crisis of 3.25 years, which we also take from Laeven
and Valencia (2012).
[Table 2 about here.]
Table 2 reports how well the model fits the targeted moments. The standard deviation
of output is matched well, the standard deviation of investment is somewhat too low. The
model can match the autocorrelation of output. It also does a good job at matching asset
prices with reasonable parameters for household preferences: the deposit rate and the credit
spread in the stochastic steady state are matched well. The standard deviation of the deposit
rate and the standard deviation of the credit spread are matched well. The model can match
the ratio of bank lending to total lending. Bank leverage in the stochastic steady state is
slightly too low. This is difficult to remedy, since a decrease in the diversion parameter,
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which increases leverage in the deterministic steady state, increases instead the bank run
probability without changing leverage substantially in the stochastic steady state. The
frequency of banking panics, is also matched well. Interestingly, we found in numerical
exercises that increasing the sunspot probability reduces the frequency of banking panics.
This is, because an increase in the expected probability of a banking crisis forces banks to
delever. This result is reminiscent of the volatility paradox discussed in Brunnermeier and
Sannikov (2014). The banking panic duration and the increase in the credit spread during
a banking panic are matched well. Overall, the model can match all moments quite well,
which is remarkable, given that it is a highly nonlinear model with complex dynamics.
6 A typical banking panic
After having calibrated the model, we first use it to study what a typical realized banking
panic looks like. The purpose of this exercise is to ensure that banking panics in the model
capture some stylized facts about financial crises in the data: Namely that they are disastrous
events which cause a long-lived fall in macroeconomic aggregates and asset prices.
6.1 Peak-to-trough changes during the financial crisis of 2007-
2009 in the model and in the data
In Table 3, we report the ability of the model to fit data from the financial crisis in the
US during the period of 2007-2009. For this exercise, we compare the effect of a typical
banking panic in the model on macroeconomic aggregates and asset prices to the peak-to-
trough changes in those variables in the data.9 In line with Gertler, Kiyotaki, and Prestipino
(2019), we assume that a banking panic happened in the data in the last quarter of 2008.
Consistent with the NBER recession dates for the financial crisis, we compute the change
9To construct the tables and figures in this section, we follow Paul (2018): first, we simulate 10000
economies for 1000 periods. We then find all banking panics and compute the average path around a typical
panic event. We discard all panics where another panic happens within 100 quarters before to 20 quarters
after the panic to ensure that we capture only the effect of a single panic.
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in output, consumption, and investment from the last quarter of 2007 to the second quarter
of 2009. We compute the change in asset prices from the first quarter of 2007 to the last
quarter of 2008, since the stress in the financial markets started earlier and peaked in the
last quarter of 2008, simultaneously to the banking panic.
[Table 3 about here.]
The model does a good job at matching a fall in output of a similar magnitude as in
the data. The model produces a somewhat too low fall in consumption around a typical
banking panic compared to the financial crisis in the US. The fall in investment in the model
is similar to the data. The fall in bank credit spreads is too small. This is natural, the model
lumps together all bank liabilities, which includes not only market lending, which is our
data counterpart, but also bank deposits. The model also matches the increase in the cost
of financing to the real economy. Note that all of these dynamics besides the peak-to-trough
change in the firm credit spread are untargeted and that we do not select the exogenous
shocks in order to match any of these dynamics.
6.2 Model dynamics around a typical banking panic
After comparing the model to the data, we now focus on the mechanism of how a banking
panic unfolds in the model. Figure 3 shows the dynamics of key macroeconomic and financial
variables around a typical banking panic in a simulation of the model. The blue, solid line
reports the average path of the respective variable around a typical panic. Since there is
substantial heterogeneity in the paths, we also report the range in which 90 percent of all
banking panics fall as the shaded area. The red, dashed line is the counterfactual average
path, if there is no panic in period zero. The difference between the blue line and the red line
gives us the additional impact of an average banking panic, given the same initial conditions
and the same sequence of capital quality shocks.10 The thin, black line reports the value of
10Alternatively, it gives us the additional change in the variable from moving from the equilibrium with
solvent banks to the equilibrium with a systemic bank default.
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the respective variable in the stochastic steady state.
[Figure 3 about here.]
In the first panel, we show the sequence of exogenous capital quality shocks around a
typical banking panic. These shocks are of course identical for the panic and the no panic
economies. We observe that banking panics typically arise after a sequence of negative capital
quality shocks. In the second panel, we see that due to the negative capital quality shocks,
the realized firm credit spread decreases. The bank credit spread increases slightly due to
a higher default premium on bank debt. As a consequence, bank profitability, which is the
difference between the firm credit spread and the bank credit spread, decreases. The bank
equity-to-assets ratio decreases as well, which implies that bank leverage increases. Leverage
is countercyclical, since the incentive constraint 2.8 ties leverage to the expected future value
of net worth, which is high in bad times when the expected firm credit spread is high. Taken
together, the lower realized firm credit spread, the higher bank credit spread and the higher
bank leverage drive down the recovery value in a systemic bank default, which we can see
in panel 6. This is despite a slight increase in the liquidation discount which is evident from
panel 5.
In panel 7, we see that due to the lower recovery value, the ex ante probability of a
banking panic is higher. If a panic is triggered, a big fall in the realized firm credit spread
occurs in the period of the panic, bank equity and bank assets fall to zero and financial
intermediation will only occur through the mutual fund sector. This leads to a spike in the
expected firm credit spread, as mutual funds require a higher expected return than banks.
As a consequence, we see in panel 9 investment decreases dramatically, and so does output
due to both the lower capital stock and the efficiency losses due to the lack of intermediation.
After the banking panic, the net worth of the banking sector slowly rebuilds as new
banks start to enter the economy. Expected returns on firm loans are high, due to the
high required return of mutual funds. Newly entering banks are therefore highly profitable,
which also means that they have a high leverage capacity. High bank leverage in turn lowers
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expected recovery values, which increases the likelihood of a second banking panic in the
aftermath of the first one. Hence, credit spreads and conditional volatility remain elevated
and investment and output subdued until the net worth of the banking sector has fully
rebuild.
Overall, we can see that banking panics are dramatic events which substantially influence
the dynamics of both macroeconomic aggregates and asset prices. Moreover, we can see that
banking panic risk is reflected in asset prices even before the panic occurs. A particular
strength of the model is that it produces the empirically observed co-movement in asset
prices and quantities before and after banking panics.
7 Quantitative effects of banking panic risk
In the last section, we have studied the conditional response of the economy to a realized
banking crisis. We have shown that both the build-up and the aftermath of a banking
crisis are episodes of high systemic risk and high conditional output volatility. While bank-
ing crises are dramatic events, they are however also rare events, such that it is unclear
whether systemic risk in the financial sector should have an effect on aggregate uncertainty
and macroeconomic dynamics outside a banking panic. Therefore, we study next the un-
conditional effects of banking panic risk on macroeconomic uncertainty and business cycle
dynamics. We first show that elevated banking panic risk increases macroeconomic uncer-
tainty unconditionally. Second, we show that this time-varying uncertainty which amplifies
the volatility of macroeconomic aggregates and asset prices.
[Table 4 about here.]
Table 4 shows that banking panic driven uncertainty amplifies macroeconomic volatility.
We compare and simulate three different models: In the first model, panics are anticipated
and materialize. To isolate the effect of banking-panic driven uncertainty, we report a second
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model, in which panics are anticipated, but never materialize. Finally, in the last model,
crises are unanticipated and never materialize.
From column 1 of Table 4, we see that banking panic risk varies substantially over time:
The unconditional probability of a banking panic is about 2 percent per year, the standard
deviation of the probability of a banking panic is 0.8 percent per year. The probability
of a panic is moreover countercyclical, since bank leverage is high and realized bank asset
returns are low during recessions, leading to low recovery values for bank creditors and hence
elevated banking panic risk.
From rows 4 to 6, we can see that banking panic risk increases aggregate uncertainty
substantially. First, in the first and second column, we see that output volatility in the
model with banking panics is about 0.55 percent, with a volatility of 0.15 percent. It is
also strongly countercyclical. Comparing the second and the third column, we observe that
banking panic risk roughly doubles the conditional expected output volatility, and increases
the volatility of the expected volatility by a factor of about 3.
Decomposing expected volatility in the expected volatility about the left tail and the
right tail, we can see that banking-panic risk increases expected volatility exclusively in the
left tail of the output distribution: Expected volatility in the left tail increases from about
0.14 percent in the model without panics to 0.5 percent in the model with panic expectations,
whereas expected volatility in the right tail in the model with expected panics is basically
identical compared to the model without panics.
Comparing the unconditional realized volatilities of output, consumption and investment
of the models with and without banking panics in Table 4, we see that realized banking
panics increase the unconditional realized volatility of output, consumption and investment.
Moreover, the realized volatility of the bank credit spread as well as the firm credit spread are
higher. When we compare the model where we isolate the effect of banking panic uncertainty
to the model without banking panics, we see that most of the increase in volatility comes
from realized banking panics, and not banking panic anticipations: The volatility of output,
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investment and consumption in the economy without banking panics is nearly exactly as
high as volatility in the economy with anticipated, but without materialized bank panics.
This does, however, not mean, that banking panic risk does not amplify volatility: In the
economy without banking panics, equilibrium leverage is higher, which makes balance sheets
of banks more sensitive to asset price fluctuations. Compared to the model without banking
crises, there are therefore two offsetting effects in the model with banking panics: On the one
hand, banking panics introduce time-varying volatility, which increases volatility. On the
other hand, as bankers and bank creditors internalize the default probability of an individual
bank, equilibrium leverage is lower, which reduces volatility.
8 Macroprudential regulation
In this section, we discuss how the banking panic-driven uncertainty channel affects the desir-
ability of a typical macroprudential policy, namely a countercyclical capital buffer (CCyB).
In the economy considered here, agents do not internalize how their decisions affect
equilibrium prices. Since equilibrium prices feed back into the incentive constraint 2.8 of
banks, there exists a pecuniary externality:11 Banks lend and borrow too much during
times of high net worth when the leverage constraint is loose, which forces them to contract
borrowing and lending excessively during times of low net worth. A regulator could increase
welfare by limiting bank lending in times of loose market leverage constraints. This relaxes
leverage constraints in times of otherwise relatively tight leverage constraints, which stabilizes
asset prices and reduces the frequency of banking panics. We show that in the presence of
panic-driven uncertainty, the benefits from the CCyB are larger. Banking-panic driven
uncertainty is therefore an important channel which macroprudential regulators should take
into account.
11For discussions of optimal regulation in the presence of pecuniary externalities, see Da´vila and Korinek
(2017) and Bianchi and Mendoza (2018).
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8.1 A capital requirement with a countercyclical buffer
Consider again the capital requirement we introduced in equation 2.14. We set φ¯ = φB, which
is the value of leverage in the stochastic steady state. We do this, because the focus of our
analysis is on the effects of the countercylical capital buffer on macroeconomic dynamics,
and not on the optimal level of capital requirements. Due to our assumption that banks
can only obtain additional equity by accumulating internal funds, an increase in the capital
requirement forces banks to reduce lending to the nonfinancial sector. According to equation
2.7, total bank lending as a deviation from the stochastic steady state can be written as
lnQtA
B
t+1 − lnQAB = lnφBt − lnφB + lnNBt − lnNB. (8.1)
If the capital requirement binds, this becomes
lnQtA
B
t+1 − lnQAB = −τ(lnNBt − lnNB) + lnNBt − lnNB
= (1− τ)(lnNBt − lnNB). (8.2)
As a stylized example to illustrate the importance of banking panic-driven uncertainty
for macroprudential regulation, we set τ = 1. For that value, the regulator can reduce the
comovement between net worth and bank lending, and hence the feedback loop between
bank balance sheets and asset prices, completely. For τ less than 1, there is still positive
comovement between net worth and bank lending, while for τ more than one, bank lending
will start to comove negatively with bank lending. τ = 0 corresponds to the case of a
constant capital requirement.
[Figure 4 about here.]
Figure 4 illustrates how the combination of a capital requirement and the CCYB works.
In the left panel, we plot the market leverage constraint as the red dashed line, the regulatory
leverage constraint as the black dotted line, and the binding leverage constraint, which is the
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minimum of the two, as the blue solid line. In the right panel, we plot the policy functions
for bank lending, QtA
B
t+1, implied by the respective constraints, as a function of bank net
worth. The countercyclical capital requirement binds during times of high bank net worth.
As net worth increases, the increase in net worth is exactly offset by a decrease in the
leverage constraint, such that the overall policy for bank lending becomes insensitive to net
worth fluctuations. Therefore, bank balance sheets and hence asset price fluctuations are
decoupled. Hence, this policy can dampen the feedback loop between bank balance sheets
and asset prices, i.e. the financial accelerator. There is therefore also a weaker pecuniary
externality which creates excessive lending of banks during times of high net worth. Since
the policy binds during times of high net worth, it will not bind during a banking panic,
such that conditional banking panic dynamics are unchanged relative to the baseline model
without regulation.
8.2 Benefits from macroprudential regulation
In this section, we evaluate the benefits of the macroprudential policy. First, we consider the
benefit due to the policy in the baseline model. This welfare gain combines the effect from a
reduction in the frequency of realized banking panics and the effect due to less uncertainty
because of lower banking panic risk. To disentangle how much of that benefit is due to
banking panic risk, we second compare the effect in the baseline model without realized
banking panics to the effect in an economy without banking panic risk.
[Table 5 about here.]
Table 5 reports various measures that are commonly considered by policymakers: the
level of output and consumption in the stochastic steady state, the volatility of output and
consumption, the frequency of banking panics, and macroeconomic uncertainty as measured
by the conditional consumption volatility described in equation 4.1.
The first two columns show the results for the economy with anticipated and realized
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banking panics. We can see that introducing the CCyB increases welfare, lowers the prob-
ability of a financial panic and lowers conditional expected output volatility. The CCyB
affects the economy through two channels: First, with a CCyB, fewer banking panics will
materialize. Hence, the realized volatility in the economy will be lower. Second, the CCyB
also reduces the expected volatility in the economy by lowering expected banking panic
risk. While the level of output and consumption are lower with the CCyB, the reduction in
volatility nevertheless leads to a small welfare gain. A formal welfare analysis incorporating
all the costs and benefits of dynamic capital requirements is however beyond the scope of
this paper.
To isolate the effect of the CCyB on the banking panic-driven uncertainty channel,
columns 3 and 4 report the effects of the macroprudential policy in the model with banking
panic risk, but without realized banking panics. Such a capital requirement can undo the
feedback loop between asset prices, bank lending and the net worth of banks, and therefore
stabilize output and consumption. It does so by dampening the link between bank net worth
and bank lending. Moreover, it reduces the likelihood of banking panics, and macroeconomic
uncertainty in the form of the conditional volatility of output. Note that the reduction in
unconditional output volatility is as large as in the model with realized panics, and the re-
duction in unconditional output volatility is even slightly larger. This is, because conditional
output volatility is small when the banking sector rebuilds after a realized financial panic.
In contrast, we can see from the last two columns that in the model without banking
panics, the capital requirement decreases conditional volatility much less than in the other
two models. This is, since it does not have the additional benefit of reducing the frequency
of banking panics. It can, however, still reduce the volatility of output and consumption.
Taken together, our results imply that banking panic-driven uncertainty is an important
novel channel that increases the welfare gains from macroprudential regulation.
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9 Conclusion
In this paper, we show that systemic risk in the banking sector breeds macroeconomic un-
certainty. We start with the observation that during the financial crisis of 2007-2008, both
measures of systemic risk in the banking sector and measures of macroeconomic uncertainty
spiked. Investment and asset prices fell, consistent with empirical evidence and theories on
the effects of an increase in uncertainty on macroeconomic outcomes.12 Motivated by these
stylized facts, we adapt a model of a production economy with a financially constrained
banking sector developed by Gertler, Kiyotaki, and Prestipino (2019) to study the link be-
tween systemic risk in the banking sector and macroeconomic uncertainty more broadly. We
augment the model along two dimensions: Banks in the model are subject to occasional and
disastrous banking panics. The probability of a banking panic, which we refer to as systemic
risk, depends on the state of the economy. Systemic risk in the model is hence endogenous.
First, households have Epstein and Zin (1989)-preferences and second, banking crises are
persistent.
We have three main findings: First, we show that an increase in systemic risk leads to an
increase in macroeconomic uncertainty. This is, because banking panics are more likely in
future states of the world with bad realizations of the exogenous shock, such that an increase
in the likelihood of a banking panic widens the left tail of the conditional distribution of future
output. To our knowledge, establishing this link between banking panic risk and aggregate
uncertainty and exploring its implications are novel contributions to the literature.
Second, we show that this endogenous uncertainty due to elevated banking panic risk feeds
back into the economy by tightening the financial constraint in the banking sector. It does
so through a financial constraints channel, which operates through the value of the banks’
cash flows and a precautionary savings channel which operates through the risk premium
charged by the households. This increases the unconditional volatility of macroeconomic
aggregates and asset prices.
12E.g. Gourio (2012), Jurado, Ludvigson, and Ng (2015), Basu and Bundick (2017).
34
Third, we show that macroprudential policies that reduce the financial accelerator ef-
fect, like for example a countercyclical capital buffer, lead to higher welfare gains if there
is endogenous banking panic risk. Therefore, we present a novel channel through which
macroprudential policy can lead to welfare gains.
The role of endogenous uncertainty due to systemic risk is a fruitful topic for future
research in both the literature on financial crises and the literature on the role of uncertainty
for business cycles. First, it leads to a new channel through which disruptions in the banking
sector can affect the aggregate economy. Second, it allows us a better understanding of where
uncertainty in the economy comes from. Third, the banking panic uncertainty presented here
is likely to be amplified through other channels that have been shown to amplify exogenous
uncertainty shocks, like nominal frictions (Basu and Bundick (2017), Born and Pfeifer (2019))
or search frictions in the labor market (Leduc and Liu (2016), Cacciatore and Ravenna
(2018)).
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A Data
The sample period is the first quarter of 1986 to the last quarter of 2018. In terms of
macroeconomic aggregates, we use real gross domestic product, real gross private domestic
investment and real personal consumption expenditures from the BEA. All aggregate series
are detrended with a series-specific log-linear trend. The real interest rate is the federal
funds rate minus the year-on-year change over the previous year in the price index for all
urban consumers for all products. The bank credit spread is the TED spread. The firm
credit spread is the Moody’s BAA bond yield minus the federal funds rate. For asset prices,
we use a pre-crisis sample to avoid the zero-lower bound period. We define the pre-crisis
sample as the first quarter of 1986 to the last quarter of 2006.
B Full statement of the model
Households’ problem
V Ht = max
aHt+1,b
H
t+1,d
H
t+1,c
H
t
(
(1− β) (cHt )1−σ + βEt [(V Ht+1)1−γ] 1−σ1−γ) 11−σ (B.1)
s.t., if no bank default:
cHt + (Qt + f
H
t )a
H
t+1 + d
H
t+1 + b
H
t+1 =
= Wt +R
A
t a
H
t +R
D
t d
H
t +R
B
t b
H
t + Πt (B.2)
if bank default:
cHt + (Qt + f
H
t )a
H
t+1 + b
H
t+1 = Wt +R
A
t a
H
t + x
D
t R
D
t d
H
t +R
B
t b
H
t + Πt (B.3)
xDt , defined below.
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Banks’ problem
V Bt = max
aBt+1,d
B
t+1
EtΛt,t+1
(
ηnBt+1 + (1− η)V Bt+1
)
(B.4)
s.t.
nBt =
 R
A
t a
B
t −RDt dBt if old
υAt if new
(B.5)
Qta
B
t+1 = d
B
t+1︸︷︷︸
Debt
+ nBt︸︷︷︸
Equity
(B.6)
ψQta
B
t+1 ≤ V Bt (B.7)
Consumption good producers’ problem
V Ft = max
aFt+1,kt+1,lt
(
ΠFt + EtΛt,t+1V Ft+1
)
(B.8)
s.t.
ΠFt = e
µAsαt l
1−α
t + (1− δ)Qtst −Qtkt+1 −Wtlt −RAt aFt + aFt+1 (B.9)
kt+1 = a
F
t+1 (B.10)
kt = Ztst (B.11)
lnZt = (1− ρZ)µZ + ρZ lnZt−1 + εZt (B.12)
Capital good producers’ problem
V Qt = max
it
(
ΠQt + EtΛt,t+1V
Q
t+1
)
(B.13)
s.t.
ΠQt = Qtit − it −
θ
2
(
it
It−1
− 1
)2
It−1 (B.14)
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Mutual funds’ problem
max
a˜Ht
ΠLt (B.15)
s.t.
ΠLt = f
H
t a˜
H
t −
χ
2
max
(
a˜Ht
At
− ζ, 0
)2
At (B.16)
Aggregation Profits of households
Πt = Π
Q
t + Π
F
t + Π
L
t + η(R
A
t A
B
t −RDt DBt − νAt) (B.17)
Bank net worth
NBt = (1− η)(RAt ABt −RDt DBt ) + ηνAt (B.18)
Market clearing Deposits
DHt+1 = D
B
t+1 (B.19)
Loans
AHt+1 + A
B
t+1 = A
F
t+1 (B.20)
Capital
It = St+1 − (1− δ)Kt (B.21)
Labor
Lt = 1 (B.22)
Loan services
A˜Ht+1 = A˜
M
t+1 (B.23)
Risk-free bond
BHt+1 = 0 (B.24)
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Aggregate resource constraint
eµ
A
Sαt L
1−α
t = C
H
t + It
(
1 + θ
(
It
It−1
− 1
)2)
(B.25)
C Proofs
Proof of Proposition 2.1. We proceed as follows: We guess that the value function is linear
in the net worth of an individual bank and then verify this guess. We guess that the value
function can be written as
V Bt = Ω
B
t n
B
t . (C.1)
The problem of a bank B.4 can be restated as follows:
ΩBt n
B
t = max
aBt+1
Et(1− pt+1)Λt,t+1
[
η + (1− η)ΩBt+1
]
nBt+1
= max
aBt+1
Et(1− pt+1)Λt,t+1
[
η + (1− η)ΩBt+1
] [
(RAt+1 −RDt+1Qt)aBt+1 +RDt+1nBt
]
s.t.
Qta
B
t+1 ≤ ΩBt nBt .
The Lagrange is given by
L = Et(1− pt+1)Λt,t+1Ω¯Bt+1
[
(RAt+1 −RDt+1Qt)aBt+1 +RDt+1nBt
]
(1 + λt)− λtQtaBt+1
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where we substitute Ω¯Bt+1 = η + (1− η)ΩBt+1. The first-order conditions are
∂L
∂aBt+1
= Et(1− pt+1)Λt,t+1Ω¯Bt+1
[
(RAt+1 −RDt+1Qt)
]
(1 + λt)− λtQt−
−Et∂pt+1
∂aBt+1
Λt,t+1Ω¯
B
t+1n
B
t+1(1 + λt) ≥ 0
∂L
∂λt
= ΩBt n
B
t −QtaBt+1 ≥ 0
λt ≥ 0
(ΩBt n
B
t −QtaBt+1)λt = 0.
We can define a bank run cutoff for the exogenous shock as
Z∗(aBt+1) = Z : n
B
t+1 = 0.
Taking the derivative with respect to the bank run probability amounts to computing the
change in this bank run cutoff:
Et
∂pt+1
∂aBt+1
Λt,t+1Ω¯
B
t+1n
B
t+1
=
∂
∂aBt+1
(∫ ∞
Z∗(aBt+1)
Λt,t+1Ω¯
B
t+1n
B
t+1dF (Z)
)
−
∫ ∞
Z∗(aBt+1)
Λt,t+1Ω¯
B
t+1
∂nBt+1
∂aBt+1
dF (Z),
which, by Leibniz’ rule, collapses to
−∂Z
∗(aBt+1)
∂aBt+1
Λt,t+1Ω¯
B
t+1n
B
t+1|Z=Z∗(aBt+1),
44
which is 0 since nBt+1|Z=Z∗(aBt+1) = 0. Thus, the first-order conditions simplify to
∂L
∂aBt+1
= Et(1− pt+1)Λt,t+1Ω¯Bt+1
[
(RAt+1 −RDt+1Qt)
]
(1 + λt)− λtQt ≥ 0 (C.2)
∂L
∂λt
= ΩBt n
B
t −QtaBt+1 ≥ 0 (C.3)
λt ≥ 0 (C.4)
(ΩBt n
B
t −QtaBt+1)λt = 0. (C.5)
Consider first the case where the borrowing constraint C.4 is binding. Then, the optimal
policy of the bank is given by
aˆBt+1 ≡
aBt+1
nBt
=
ΩBt
ψQt
.
With this, we can rewrite the value function as
ΩBt =
Et(1− pt+1)Λt,t+1Ω¯Bt+1RDt+1
1− ψEt(1− pt+1)Λt,t+1Ω¯Bt+1
[
RAt+1
Qt
−RDt+1
] . (C.6)
This expression only depends on aggregate variables, as we initially guessed. Consider next
the case of the non-binding constraint. In that case, only ABt+1, i.e. the optimal policy of
the entire banking sector, is pinned down by the first order condition C.2, with λt = 0. We
assume that individual banks follow a rule
aˆBt+1 =
ABt+1
NBt
, (C.7)
aBt+1 = aˆ
B
t+1n
B
t . (C.8)
This implies that the solution is again linear in the net worth of an individual bank, and we
again can compute the value function of the bank as in C.6, showing that it only depends
on aggregate values. Hence, we can indeed write the value function of the bank as V Bt =
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ΩBt n
B
t .
D Full statement of the equilibrium
First, we characterize the equilibrium if the banking sector is solvent. We then highlight
how the equilibrium changes if the banking sector is insolvent. Since we use the concept of a
recursive competitive equilibrium, we switch to a recursive notation, i.e. Xt = X, Xt+1 = X
′,
and Xt−1 = X−1 for any variable X. Bold symbols denote functions.
D.1 The equilibrium with solvent banks
The state of the economy is given by Y = (NB, K, I−1, Z,Ξ). Ξ ∈
{
ΞR,ΞN
}
is a sunspot
shock that selects in which equilibrium the economy is if there are multiple equilibria. It
evolves according to a Markov chain, with
Pr(Ξ = ΞR) = pR (D.1)
A recursive competitive equilibrium is a set of price functions Q(Y),W(Y),RA(Y),
RD
′
(Y), R˜D(Y) and f(Y), perceived laws of motion of the states K′(Y , ′,Ξ′) and NB′(Y , ′,Ξ′)
and a perceived banking panic probability p(Y , ′,Ξ′), a value function VH(Y) and policy
functions CH(Y),AH′(Y),DH′(Y) and A˜H′(Y) for households, a value function VB(Y) and
policy functions AB
′
(Y) and DB′(Y) for banks, policy functions for consumption goods
producers, S′(Y),AF′(Y),L(Y), a policy function for capital producers, I(Y), and a policy
function for mutual funds A˜M
′
(Y) that solve the respective optimization problems of all
agents as defined in appendix B, clear the markets for retail loans,
AF
′
(Y) = AH′(Y) + AB′(Y), (D.2)
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labor,
LF(Y) = 1, (D.3)
investment goods,
I(Y) = SF′(Y)− (1− δ)K, (D.4)
bank liabilities,
DB(Y) = DH(Y), (D.5)
and loan services,
A˜H
′
(Y) = A˜M′(Y), (D.6)
ensure that the perceived laws of motion correspond to the actual laws of motion for capital,
K′(Y , ′,Ξ′) = Z exp(µZ + σZ′)S′(Y), (D.7)
bank net worth,
NB
′
(Y , ′,Ξ′) =
 N
B′
No Run(Y , ′,Ξ′) with probability 1− p(Y , ′,Ξ′)
0 with probability p(Y , ′,Ξ′)
(D.8)
NB
′
No Run(Y , ′,Ξ′) =
[
RA(Y′(Y , ′,Ξ′))AB′(Y)−RD′(Y)DB′(Y)
]
(1− η) + nB,new,′η,
(D.9)
and satisfy the aggregate resource constraint 2.22. Asset returns are given by
R˜D(Y) = RD(Y−1) (D.10)
and
RA(Y) = Z (αKα−1 + (1− δ)Q(Y)) . (D.11)
We summarize the laws of motion of the state as Y′(Y , ′,Ξ′). We specify the probability of
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a banking panic p(Y , ′,Ξ′) below.
D.2 The equilibrium with a systemic bank default
We denote functions relating to the equilibrium with a systemic bank default with a star (∗).
If incumbent banks are insolvent, their net worth is 0. We assume that, conditional on the
incumbent banks being insolvent, new bankers do not enter the economy and return their
resources to the representative household. Hence, the aggregate net worth of the banking
sector is 0 and the state of the economy collapses to Y∗ = (K, I−1, Z,Ξ). The asset demand
of banks is zero, as is the amount of debt issued by banks:
AB
′∗(Y∗) = 0, (D.12)
DB
′∗(Y∗) = 0. (D.13)
The capital price is given by Q∗(Y∗), the return to firm loans by
RA∗(Y∗) = Z (αKα−1 + (1− δ)Q∗(Y∗)) . (D.14)
In the quantitative solution to the model, the demand for assets by banks, and hence the
demand for assets overall, is increasing in the net worth of banks. Hence, the capital price
with insolvent banks is lower than the capital price with solvent banks.
In the equilibrium with insolvent banks, the households recover the assets of the banks
instead of their lending. Hence, the return on loans to banks is given by
R˜D∗(Y∗) = xD∗(Y−1, ε,Ξ)RD(Y−1) (D.15)
and
xD∗(Y−1, ε,Ξ) = R
A∗(Y∗)AB′(Y−1)
RD′(Y−1)DB′(Y−1) . (D.16)
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Incumbent banks exit once they are liquidated. Panics are persistent and continue into
the next period with probability 1− pi. New banks start re-entering the economy at rate η
only once the panic has ended. Formally, this assumption implies that the net worth of the
banking sector evolves as
NB
′∗(Y∗, ′,Ξ′) =
 ηn
B,new′ with probability pi
0 with probability 1− pi
. (D.17)
E Robustness
In this section, we explore how the results in section 7 depend on key model assumptions,
namely EZ preferences and persistent banking panics. We investigate how the results change
if we assume that banking panics only last one period, as in Gertler, Kiyotaki, and Prestipino
(2019). We also investigate the importance of assuming EZ-preferences.
[Table 6 about here.]
First, we see that in the case of the model with EZ-preferences and one period panics, the
banking panic probability is much lower. It also has a lower standard deviation. As a conse-
quence, the conditional consumption volatility is much lower. Unconditional macroeconomic
volatility is consequently also much lower.
Comparing the first and the fourth column, we see the effects of moving from EZ-
preferences to log-utility, which corresponds to a decrease in the risk aversion and the in-
tertemporal elasticity of substitution. As a consequence, the probability of banking panics
increases slightly. Firm credit spreads are lower, as risk aversion is lower. Overall, the results
are however very similar to the baseline model.13
Finally, comparing the first and the fifth column shows us how important the assumptions
of EZ-preferences and persistent panics jointly are for the results. The model with log-utility
13In unreported results, we found that the main channel through which preferences matter is the IES, not
the risk aversion. The IES in our baseline model is already quite close to 1. Thus, changing to log utility
does not affect the economy very much.
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and one-period panics produces lower banking panic risk and macroeconomic uncertainty
as the baseline model. These risks are reflected in lower credit spreads, lower conditional
volatility and lower unconditional volatility.
Overall, Table 6 tells us that our results are qualitatively robust to changes in the key
assumptions, in particular preferences. Persistent panics and EZ-preferences are however
important for the quantitative results of the model, especially for its asset pricing implica-
tions.
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Figure 1: Measures of systemic risk (top left), aggregate uncertainty (top right), credit spreads (bottom left) and
investment (bottom right).
Note: Sample period: 2000Q1 to 2018Q4. The data for the TED spread and uncertainty are monthly, the data for credit spreads
and investment quarterly. The TED spread is the 3-month LIBOR minus the 3-month US treasury rate. The macroeconomic
uncertainty indices, which measure real and macro-financial uncertainty, are taken from Jurado, Ludvigson, and Ng (2015),
available at https://www.sydneyludvigson.com/data-and-appendixes. We use uncertainty at the 3-month-horizon. Credit
spreads are relative to 10-year US treasuries. Real investment is the year-on-year change in real gross private domestic investment.
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Figure 2: The conditional volatility of output in economies with and without sunspots.
Note: We hold the state of the economy at time t fixed. The policy functions come from the numerical solution of the model under
the baseline calibration, where for the economy with sunspots, pR = 0.0075 while for the economy without sunspots, pR = 0.
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Figure 3: Dynamics around a typical banking panic.
Note: The blue line denotes the response of an average economy around a banking panic. Since there is substantial heterogeneity
in the simulation, the shaded area reports the range within which 90 percent of the typical banking crises fall. The red line shows
the average response across economies if no banking panic occurs, given the same initial conditions and the same sequence of
shocks. Moments of a simulation of 10000 economies for 1000 periods. We drop all crises where a previous crisis occurred in the
last 100 quarters before the panic until 20 periods after the panic.
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Figure 4: Policy functions with a countercyclical capital requirement.
Note: The policy functions for the binding bank leverage constraint and the regulatory leverage constraint (left panel) and bank
lending (right panel) as a function of the net worth of the banking sector in the case of a countercyclical capital requirement. We
set φ¯ = φB , i.e. to the value of leverage in the stochastic steady state, and τ = 1.
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Tables
Technology
α 0.36 Production function 36 % Capital income share (standard value)
δ 0.025 Depreciation rate 10 % Annual depreciation rate (standard value)
θ 1.35 Investment adjustment cost Volatility, investment (data)
ρZ 0.75 Autocorrelation, shock Autocorrelation, output (data)
σε,Z 0.005 Bolatility, shock Volatility, output (data)
Preferences
β 0.995 HH discount factor Real risk-free rate: 1.87 % p.a. in SSS (data)
σ 0.8511 Inverse of IES Real risk-free rate volatility (data)
γ 35 Rel. risk aversion Credit spread volatility (data)
Finance
χ 0.028 Intermediation cost Bank intermed.: 50 % in SSS (Gertler and Kiyotaki (2015))
ζ 0.2409 Intermediation cost ∆ credit spread in panic: 7.29 % p.a. (data)
ψ 0.385 Diversion Leverage: 10 in SSS (Gertler and Kiyotaki (2015))
η 0.0908 Exit Rate Avg. credit spread: 3 % p.a. (data)
υ 1e-3 New banks’ endowment Small value
Sunspot
pR 0.0075 Sunspot prob. Banking panic probability: 2.5 % p.a. (Laeven and Valencia (2012))
pi 12/13 Reentry prob. Banking panics last 13 quarters (Laeven and Valencia (2012))
Table 1: Calibration
55
Data Model
St. Dev., Output (%) 4.073 4.113
St. Dev., Investment (%) 12.311 11.081
Autocorrelation, Output 99.008 98.860
Deposit Rate in SSS (% p.a.) 1.870 1.834
Credit Spread in SSS (% p.a.) 3.886 3.492
St. Dev., Deposit Rate (%) 2.107 2.114
St. Dev., Credit Spread (%) 1.614 1.649
Bank Lending/Total Lending in SSS (%) 50.000 47.824
Bank Leverage in SSS 10.000 8.135
Bank Run Frequency (% p.a.) 2.500 2.369
Bank Run Duration (yrs) 3.250 3.271
Mean, ∆ Credit Spread in Crisis (% p.a.) 7.290 7.426
Table 2: Targeted moments
Note: The simulated moments come from a simulation of 10000 economies for 2000 periods, discarding the first 1000 periods
as burn-in. The stochastic steady state is computed as the state of the economy after a simulation of 1000 periods without any
shocks.
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Data Model
Output (%) -3.983 -6.238
Consumption (%) -2.394 -1.233
Investment (%) -29.429 -22.715
Bank Credit Spread (% p.a.) 1.356 0.258
Firm Credit Spread (% p.a.) 7.293 7.426
Table 3: Peak-to-trough changes during the financial crisis of 2007-2009 in macroeconomic aggregates and asset
prices in the model and the data.
Note: For output, consumption and investment, we define the peak of the great recession as the last quarter of 2007 and the
trough as the second quarter of 2009, consistent with the NBER recession dates. For the bank credit spread and the firm credit
spread, we define the peak as January 2007 and the trough as October 2008. The model moments come from a simulation of
10000 economies for 2000 periods, discarding the first 1000 periods as burn-in.
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With Only No
Panics Uncertainty Panics
Systemic Risk
Mean, Panic Probability (% p.a.) 2.239 2.161 -
St. Dev., Panic Probability (% p.a.) 0.775 0.652 -
Corr. with Output, Panic Probability (% p.a.) -0.693 -0.869 -
Aggregate Uncertainty
Mean, StDevt(Yt+1) (%) 0.591 0.552 0.267
St. Dev., StDevt(Yt+1) (%) 0.156 0.028 0.010
Corr. with Output, StDevt(Yt+1) (%) -0.075 -0.450 -0.881
Aggregate Uncertainty, Left Tail
Mean, StDev−t (Yt+1) (%) 0.481 0.502 0.137
St. Dev., StDev−t (Yt+1) (%) 0.058 0.030 0.006
Corr. with Output, StDev−t (Yt+1) (%) -0.140 -0.426 -0.811
Aggregate Uncertainty, Right Tail
Mean, StDev+t (Yt+1) (%) 0.298 0.230 0.229
St. Dev., StDev+t (Yt+1) (%) 0.225 0.006 0.009
Corr. with Output, StDev+t (Yt+1) (%) -0.034 -0.771 -0.891
Macroeconomic Dynamics
St. Dev., Output (%) 4.115 2.899 2.965
St. Dev., Consumption (%) 5.017 4.488 4.544
St. Dev., Investment (%) 11.060 3.780 3.596
Asset Prices
Mean, Bank Credit Spread (% p.a.) 0.043 0.032 -0.001
Mean, Firm Credit Spread (% p.a.) 4.117 3.523 3.135
St. Dev., Bank Credit Spread (% p.a.) 0.039 0.015 0.005
St. Dev., Firm Credit Spread (% p.a.) 1.650 0.269 0.310
Table 4: The importance of banking-panic driven uncertainty for macroeconomic dynamics and asset prices.
Note: With Panics is the model with expected and realized banking panics. Only Uncertainty is the model with expected, but
without realized banking panics. No Panics is the recalibrated model with neither expected nor realized banking panics. The
moments come from a simulation of 10000 economies for 2000 periods, discarding the first 1000 periods as burn-in.
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With Panics Only Uncertainty No Panics
Baseline CCyB Baseline CCyB Baseline CCyB
Macroeconomic Aggregates
Output, Mean (Baseline = 100) 100.000 100.119 100.000 99.759 100.000 99.734
Consumption, Mean (Baseline = 100) 100.000 100.291 100.000 99.389 100.000 99.022
Output, St. Dev. (%) 4.113 3.756 2.900 2.493 2.966 2.558
Consumption, St. Dev. (%) 5.017 4.846 4.490 4.343 4.546 4.454
Systemic Risk and Aggregate Uncertainty
Mean, Panic Probability (% p.a.) 2.239 1.799 2.161 1.675 - -
Mean, StDevt(Yt+1) (%) 0.591 0.494 0.552 0.444 0.267 0.212
Mean, StDev−t (Yt+1) (%) 0.481 0.406 0.502 0.405 0.137 0.114
Mean, StDev+t (Yt+1) (%) 0.298 0.238 0.230 0.175 0.229 0.179
Welfare
Welfare, Mean (Baseline = 100) 100.000 100.076 100.000 99.996 100.000 99.930
Table 5: The effects of a countercyclical capital requirement.
Note: With panics is the model with anticipated and realized banking panics. Only Uncertainty is the model with anticipated, but
without realized banking panics. No panics is the model without banking panics. Baseline refers to the model without regulation,
CCyB to the model with a countercyclical capital buffer. The moments come from a simulation of 10000 economies for 2000
periods, discarding the first 1000 periods as burn-in.
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